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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
found the existence of a nusance per se in a personal injury suit. It is
suggested that the label serves no purpose whatever in personal injury
cases, and its use there should be discontinued. Actually, in such
cases the only relevant issues are those of ultrahazardous, intentional,
or negligent misconduct. To refer to nuisance at all is superfluous
and might well be dispensed with.
L. WILLIAm HOUGER
Prenatal Injury. Seattle-First National Bank v. Rankin' is the first
Washington case allowing recovery for injuries suffered before birth
because of negligence. By recognizing a cause of action for prenatal
injuries, this jurisdiction joins the trend of recent decisions in the area.
The suit was based on a malpractice claim brought by the Seattle-
First National Bank as guardian ad litem for the minor plaintiff
against a Seattle physican. The plaintiff's mother had employed the
defendant to attend her during pregnancy and ultimate delivery. The
plaintiff was born with permanent brain damage and resulting cerebral
palsy. The complaint alleged that this brain damage was the proximate
result of the defendant's negligence, in that he failed (1) to discover
(2) to ascertain from the mother's pelvic measurements the difficulty
or impossibility of a normal delivery, and (3) to perform a Caesarean
section in sufficient time to save the plaintiff from injury. (Instead the
defendant had attempted a natural delivery.) The trial court gave
judgment in accordance with the jury verdict in favor of the plaintiff.
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court affirmed.
Acknowledging that the issue of tort recovery for prenatal injuries
had never been presented in this jurisdiction, the court cited a number
of recent decisions from other jurisdictions permitting such a cause of
action,2 and chose to follow what it termed "the clear trend of recent
decisions."3 Quoting from the New York case of Woods v. Lancet,4
which sets forth the proposition that a viable fetus has a separate
existence which should be recognized by the law, the Washington
court reasoned that its "holding does not collide with any unyielding
theoretical barrier."' The court determined that the difficulties of
159 Wn.2d 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962).
2 The court, id. at 291, 367 P.2d at 838, cites five recent cases in the area. Keyes v.
Constr. Serv. Inc., 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E.2d 912 (1960) ; Bennett v. Hymers, 101
N.H. 483, 147 A.2d 108 (1958) ; Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960) ;
Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 164 A.2d 93 (1960) ; Wendt v. Lillo, 182 F.Supp. 56
(N.D. Iowa 1960).
3 59 Wn.2d 288, 291, 367 P2d 835, 838.
4303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
- 59 Wn.2d 288, 291, 367 P.2d 835, 838.
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proof inherent in a cause of action for prenatal injuries in no way
affected the legal right asserted. The opinion then discussed the evi-
dentiary factors significant in the case at bar, concluding that the case
had been properly sent to the jury.
Recognition of a cause of action for a prenatal tort has developed in
the past two decades. It was not until 1949 that an American court of.
highest jurisdiction allowed such an action in absence of a statute.!.
The majority position clearly was contrary, twelve states having re--
fused to permit such a cause of action.' This denial of tort recovery for
a prenatal injury evolved mainly from the decision rendered by Mr.
Justice (then Judge) Holmes in Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Nortkamp-:
ton,' which is generally cited as the first case in a common law jurisdic-
tion to present the precise issue.' In this early Massachusetts case the
administrator under a wrongful death statute sought to recover for
the death of a child, born as a result of a miscarriage. The mother,
more than four months pregnant, had fallen on a defective highway of
the defendant town. Mr. Justice Holmes denied recovery, holding .that
the child was not a "person" within the meaning of, the statte.-
6Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc., 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949)
commented on by Taylor, Liability for Negligent Injury to the Unborn, 36 DicTA .323,
325 (1959) and Yearick, The Viable Child, INs. L.J., Dec. 1949, p. 885. Note, however,
that in 1946 in Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F.Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946), the federal court for
the District of Columbia allowed a right of action to an infant for injuries suffered
when it was viable, relying only upon the common law for its reasoning. A cause'of
action for prenatal injury had been allowed in California under a statute, Scott v..
McPheeters, 33 Cal.App.2d 626, 92 P.2d 678, rehearing denied, 93 P24 562 (1939), and:
in Louisiana under its civil law, Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So2d 352 (La. App. 1923).
Canada, under the influence of the civil law, had also allowed a recovery. Montreal
Tramways v. Leveille, Can. Supp. Ct. 456, 4 D.L.R. 337 (1933).
7 Annot, 10 A.L.R.2d 1059, 1060 (1950) states, "The rule, as supported by the-
numerical weight of authority, is that a child or its personal representative, in the
absence of statute, has no right of action for prenatal injuries." The editor then cites
cases from Alabama, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, Missouri, New Jersey, New
York, Ohio (observed to be limited by the Williams decision, supra note 6), Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, Texas, Wisconsin and Ireland supporting this rule. Three years
later, in Annot., 27 A.L.R.2d 1256, 1256-59 (1953), it is noted that Massachusetts and
Pennsylvania have reaffirmed their earlier position denying recovery; Nebraska has
expressly reserved the question of whether a child born alive can maintain an action for
prenatal injuries; New York has allowed recovery, limiting its holding to viable;
children; Maryland and Georgia have considered the problem and allowed a cause of
action; and Ohio has permitted recovery under a wrongful death statute. At page
1259 the editor states, "It appears worthy to note that at the present time there are ten'jurisdictions in which a right of action for prenatal injuries has been denied and
seven in which such an action has been recognized. However, the fact that six jiris-
dictions out of seven in the past several years have recognized such an action indicates
a definite trend away from the more orthodox view."
8 138 Mass. 14, 52 Am. Rep. 242 (1884).
o See White, The Right of Recovery for Prenatal Injuries, 12 LA. L. REv.,383(1952) ; Reed, Pre-Natal Injuries: Development of the Right of Recovery, 10 Dz-
PENSE L.J. 29 (1961); Comment, Tort Actions for Injuries to Unborn Infants, 3
VAND. L. REv. 282 (1950). Taylor, supra note 6 at 324, calls it the "first American
case."
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Dietrich was soon followed by a case in Illinois"° and by a case in
Ireland." "These three cases formed the pattern into which the cases
of the next half century were to fall."' 2
In 1939 this majority position was set out in the Restatement of
Torts: "A person who negligently causes harm to an unborn child is
not liable to such child for the harm."' 3 However, as Dean Prosser
stated in 1941, "All writers who have discussed the problem have
joined in condemning the existing rule, in maintaining that the unborn
child in the path of an automobile is as much of a person in the street
as the mother, and urging that recovery should be allowed upon proper
proof.'
4
This nonrecognition of the child's rights for purposes of prenatal
tort was anomalous in view of the protection generally extended to the
unborn child in other areas,15 notably the law of property 6 and of
crimes.
The several reasons which have been asserted to support the rule
10 Allaire v. St. Luke's Hosp., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900), affirming 78 Il.
App. 491 (1898). Plaintiff's mother had entered defendant hospital for pre-delivery
care and was severely injured in the hospital elevator, due to negligence in its operation.
Plaintiff was born four days later and also suffered from these injuries. Recovery was
denied on the ground that for purposes of tort action the infant was not regarded as
in being at the time of the injury, but was still a part of the mother. A vigorous dissent
by Justice Boggs set forth what in effect is the majority reasoning today. 56 N.E.
at 641.
11 Walker v. Great Northern Ry., 28 L.R. Ir. 69 (Q.B. 1891). Here the mother was
injured while a passenger on defendant's trolley, and the plaintiff child, later born
alive, was also injured. Recovery was denied on the theory that no duty was owed to
the plaintiff child, there being only a duty existing to the mother because the contract
of carriage was only with the mother and made in ignorance of the child's existence.
Dicta to the effect that there could be no recovery for a prenatal injury can be at-
tributed only to two members of the bench.
12 Comment, supra note 9 at 284.
13 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 869 (1939).
14 PROSSER, TORTS § 31, at 190 (1941).
15 "The common law, while it recognized and protected the rights and interests of
an unborn child in some respects, flatly denied them in others, most obviously where
a tort was concerned. The rationale most relied upon seemed to be that an unborn
child was but a part of the mother, and had no existence or being which could be
subject to injury. This view in the field of torts was flatly contradictory of recog-
nition given the rights of an infant en ventre sa mere in other branches of law."
Note, 14 MONT. L. REv. 128 (1953).
16 Taylor, supra note 6 at 324, expresses it this way: "The American civil law
regards a baby in his mother's womb as capable of taking a legacy or devise. The
word 'children' or 'issue' as used in a bequest, or a life insurance policy, or a work-
men's compensation act, would include a baby in his mother's womb. With respect to
such property rights posthumous children are regarded as in being from the time of
conception."
17 For example, RCW 9.48.070 provides: "The wilful killing of an unborn quick
child, by any injury committed upon the mother of such child, is manslaughter." See
also RCW 9.48.080, 9.48.090 and RCW chapter 9.02. White, supra note 9 at 396.
states, "It has been held to be murder if a child is born alive but later dies from
injuries feloniously inflicted before birth, and abortion is made a crime by statute in
practically all jurisdictions."
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of nonrecognition as may be summarized as 1) lack of precedent; 2)
stare decisis; 3) lack of duty owing to the unborn infant since it is a
part of its mother; 4) supposed conjecture and speculation in ascer-
taining the causation factor; and 5) fear of fictious claims and excessive
litigation.
The major counter-arguments favoring recovery 9 are that 1) a
viable child capable of separate existence should be regarded as a
separate entity; 2) property law and criminal law recognize and pro-
tect the rights of the unborn child; 3) natural justice requires a
recognition of these rights;" 4) if the right is not recognized the wrong
inflicted admits of no remedy; and 5) a lack of precedent is not a
valid reason to deny recovery when a wrong has been committed.
Denial of the child's existence as a being separate from its mother is
untenable in light of modern medical knowledge.2' The Washington
court logically meets the causation factor argument for denying
recovery:22
We are not unmindful of the fact that a claim for prenatal injuries is
prone to present difficult causation issues. This, however, is no reason
to deny the sufficiency of the pleading. Difficulty of proof does not
prevent the assertion of a legal right.
The fear of a flood of litigation has not been borne out by the experi-
ence of courts which early allowed recovery. Dean White succinctly
meets this argument of potential increased and fictious litigation by
1s Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 1059, 1062 (1950) ; Ramsey, Liability for Prenatal Injuries,
INs. L.J., March 1956, p. 151, 151-52; Note, 9 W. REs. L. REv. 499, 501 (1958).
10 Annot, 10 A.L.R2d 1059, 1065; Ramsey, id. at 154.20 This may perhaps be best illustrated by the case of Korman v. Hagen, 165 Minn.
320, 206 N.W. 650 (1925), where a child was allowed to recover for injuries resulting
from malpractice in the course of its delivery. White, supra note 9 at 387, points out
this case, noting that it seems to have been overlooked by other writers in the area.
He says, "Clearly the child had not been born at the time the injuries were inflicted,
but apparently the point did not occur to either counsel or the court. It might very well
be argued that this case demonstrates what the natural instincts of justice and the
common sense of the situation produces [sic] when the court is not distracted by
decisions reached under less appealing circumstances."
21 In Smith v. Brennan, 31 N.J. 353, 157 A2d 497, 502 (1960), speaking for a
unanimous court judge Proctor says, "The third reason for the rule denying recovery
was the theory that an unborn child was a part of the mother, and therefore not a
person in being to whom a duty of care could be owed. All the courts that have per-
mitted recovery for prenatal injuries have disagreed with this theory. They have found
that the existence of an infant separate from its mother begins before birth.... Medical
authorities have long recognized that a child is in existence from the moment of con-
ception, and not merely a part of its mother's body. See 1 BEcK, MaIcASL Ju isRu-
DENCE, 683 et seq. (1931) ; CORNER, OURSELVES UNBORN, 69 (1944) ; HERZOG, MancA.
JURISPRUDEN E 277 (11th ed. 1860); PATTEN, HumAN EMRYOLOGY, 181 (1946);
MALOY, LEaI. ANATOmY AND SURGERY, 716 et seq. (2d ed. 1955)."
22 59 Wn.2d 288, 292, 367 P.2d 835, 838. For an excellent discussion of the prob-
lems of proof see Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on, the Law Relating to
Prenatal Injuries, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 554, 586-600 (1962). -.
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pointing out that abuses could be effectively restrained by several
methods.23 These include a cautious, case-by-case approach by courts,
a conservative approach in evaluating the evidence to determine if
there is an issue for the jury, and, in final resort, corrective measures by
the legislature if they should become necessary.
This brief analysis is offered to explain the recent trend of American
courts toward recognition of a cause of action for prenatal injuries.
The growth and change in the area is described by Dean Prosser :24
Beginning with a decision in the District of Columbia in 1946, a series
of cases, many of them overruling former holdings, have held than an
infant born alive may maintain an action for prenatal injuries, and that
an action for wrongful death will lie where it dies as a result of such
injuries after birth. The reversal is so definite and marked as to leave
no doubt that this will be the law of the future in the United States.
The cases thus far have involved viable infants, capable of independent
life at the time of the accident, and have rather carefully limited their
rule to such situations. There appears to be no good reason for the
distinction, which will inevitably involve difficult questions of proof;
and there has been some indication of a willingness to extend the re-
covery even to the non-viable infant if satisfactory medical evidence
as to causation should ever be available.
As indicated, the cases arise in four situations, dependent upon
whether the injury was fatal or non-fatal, and whether the child was
viable or nonviable at the time of injury. A fatal injury may be the
basis of a wrongful death action,2" while a nonfatal injury may give rise
to a tort claim by the infant for prenatal injuries. Added to these fac-
tors is the variable of viability. A viable fetus is one which is capable
of living independently of the mother.26 The fetus is generally acknow-
ledged to reach this stage of development at approximately the
23 White, supra note 9 at 402-06.
24 PROSSER, TORTS § 36, at 175 (2d ed. 1955). See also 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS
§ 18.3 (1956).
25 It is generally recognized that even under wrongful death statutes recovery is
conditioned upon the decedent's right to have recovered for the injury. See Comment,
supra note 9 at 294 and Annot., 10 A.L.R.2d 1059 at 1069. The right of action under
Washington's wrongful death statute is set forth in RCW 4.20.010: "When the death
of a person is caused by the wrongful act, neglect or default of another his personal
representative may maintain an action for damages against the person causing the
death; and although the death shall have been caused under such circumstances as
amount, in law, to a felony."
2r MALOY, MEDICAL DICTIONARY FOR LAWYERS 706 (3d ed. 1960), defines viable in
the following way: "Not born dead, capable of living, said of a fetus that can live
outside of the uterus." It is defined in DORLAND, ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL DIcTIONARY
1528 (23d ed. 1957) as, "Capable of living; especially said of a fetus that has reached
such a stage of development that it can live outside of the uterus." Distinguish this
from the "quick" fetus. MALOY, id. at 598, defines quickening as "The first movements
of the fetus in the uterus felt by the mother, usually occurring about the middle of
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twenty-sixth week of pregnancy; it is apparent, however, that this
standard is impossible of completely accurate application since this
would require exactness in determining the time of conception. Thet
earlier decisions allowing recovery for prenatal injury attach some;
weight to the viability factor, but the courts have begun to allow:
recovery regardless of a determination that the injury was inflicted,
upon the infant when it was clearly nonviable. A survey of the latest*
decisions in the area reveals that twenty-five27 jurisdictions have!
indicated favor toward the recognition of a cause of action for prenatal
injuries in some combination of the variables. 8 A state by state de-
termination is set out in the appendix; the reader is also referred to'
an excellent summary in the Defense Law Journal," a recent comment
discussing these decisions 0 and a comprehensive article on the back-
ground of the law in this area in the commonwealth and other nations.8
The decision in Rankin indicates a definite trend. The court, how-
ever, did not provide an extensive rationale for its conclusions nor did
it indicate the limitations, if any, to the scope of the decision. This
course is perhaps the wisest, for as Dean White has stated, "One: of
the oldest judicial techniques is to proceed cautiously in a new area,
pricking out the law case by case.""2
BEVERLY RosENow'
pregnancy-from the sixteenth to the twentieth week." DoRLAND, supra, at 1145, gives.
as the third definition of "quick" the following: "Pregnant and able to feel the fetal"
movements," and defines quickening as "The first recognizable movements of the fetus
in utero appearing from the sixteenth to the eighteenth week of pregnancy."
271nto this number were counted the favorable attitudes recently expressed by the
Michigan and Wisconsin courts. Also calculated separately were the federal court
holdings in the District of Columbia case and the Iowa district court case. See the
appendix for further reference.
28 It should be noted that policy considerations become of vital importance in this
area. Undoubtedly the easiest factual pattern for the court will be that in the Rankin
type case-a prenatal injury to an unborn viable infant which is later born alive and.
sues for recovery in its own right. The viability factor seems to be of importance in.
smoothing the road of proof of causation, since injury to a nonviable fetus inherently
presents extremely difficult proof problems. However, as indicated earlier, the difficulty
of proof should not be determinative on the issue of existence of a cause of action.
More difficult situations face the court in cases involving stillborn infants. Allowance
of recovery for injuries to a child born dead appears to constitute an award to the
parents for grief and suffering, whereas recovery to a living person serves an easily
recognizable social utility. Courts are influenced by these considerations and the de-
cisions must be analyzed with this in mind. For example, in West v. McCoy, 233
S.C. 369, 105 S.E.2d 88 (1958) the court held that an action did not lie for the wrong-
ful death of an unborn child which was "quick" but not viable at the time of injury.
The court states, 105 S.E2d at 91, "The policy considerations which call for a right
of action when a child survives do not necessarily apply in absence of survival."
29 Reed, supra note 9 at 36-41.
30 Proctor, Prenatal Injuries-"Killng or Maiming Is Excused it; Texas, If the
Victim Doesn't Ovn a Birth Certificate," 6 So. TEx. L.J. 102 (1962).31 Winfield, The Unborn Child, 4 U. OF TORONTO L.J. 278 (1942).
32 White, supra note 9 at 404.
1963]
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Appendix
This appendix attempts to set out what is believed to be the current
position in the state and federal jurisdictions in which the issue of
prenatal injury has been presented. For other cases and the history in
this area, see 20 A.L.R. 1505 (1922); 97 A.L.R. 1524 (1935); 10
A.L.R.2d 1059 (1950); 27 A.L.R.2d 1256 (1953). See also Brief for
Respondent, Appendix, pp. 1-12, Seattle-First National Bank v. Ran-
kin, 59 Wn.2d 288, 367 P.2d 835 1962.
* = Cause of action denied; t Cause of action recognized.
FEDERAL:
Bonbrest v. Kotz3" Viable Prenatal injury t
Wendt v. Lillo3" Viable Wrongful death t
Sox v. United States35  Viable Prenatal injury t
Turnknett v. Keaton 36  Prenatal injury *
STATE:
Alabama
Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry
Viable Wrongful death
California
Scott v. McPheeters38  Viable Prenatal injury t
Norman v. Murphy 9  Nonviable Wrongful death *
Colorado4"
33 65 F.Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
34 182 F.Supp. 56 (N.D. Iowa 1960).
35 187 F.Supp. 465 (E.D. S.C. 1960). See also cases cited notes 73 and 74 infra.
36 266 F.2d 572 (5th Cir. 1959). See also note 76 infra.
ST214 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926).
38 33 Cal.App.2d 629, 92 P.2d 678, rehearing denied, 93 P.2d 562 (1939). The action
was based on a statute providing "A child conceived, but not yet born, is to be deemed
an existing person, so far as may be necessary for its interests in the event of its
subsequent birth."
39 124 Cal.App.2d 95, 268 P.2d 178 (1954). The unborn infant had been carried
more than four and one-half months when the accident and resulting miscarriage
occurred.
40 There is no holding in this state, but Taylor, supra note 6 at 328 notes this
settlement: "What will be the law in Colorado? Richard John Marquez, by his father
as next friend, brought a claim in Denver District Court against a doctor alleging pre-
natal injury due to malpractice causing a brain injury which 'caused him to be mentally
retarded and to have a spastic condition, which condition will be permanent throughout
his life. He asked for $500,000 damages. A motion to dismiss was filed based on the
theory that no recovery could be had for prenatal injury. The attorneys for Richard
invoked Sections 3 and 6 of Article II of the Colorado Constitution declaring, 'All
persons have certain natural, essential and inalienable rights among which may be
reckoned the right of enjoying. . . their lives . . .' and 'Courts of justice shall be open
to every person, and a speedy remedy afforded for every injury to person. . . .' They
further claimed that these sections were at least equal to the Ohio Constitutional pro-
visions in Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc. [See note 6 supra.] No decision
was rendered. The case was settled."
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Connecticut
Tursi v. New England Windsor41
Viable
Prates v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.42
Viable
Delaware
Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc.43
Viable
Georgia
Tucker v. Howard L. Carmichael & Sons 4
Viable
Porter v. Lassiter 5  "Quick"
Hornbuckle v. Plantation Pipe Line Co. 6
Nonviable
Illinois
Amann v. Faidy"7
Rodriguex v. Patti"
Iowa,9
Kansas
Hale v. Manion 0
Kentucky
Mitchell v. Couch 1
Louisiana
Cooper v. Blanck5 2
Maryland
Damasiewicz v. Gorsuch 3
Viable
Viable
Viable
Viable
Viable
"Quick"
Prenatal injury
Wrongful death
Wrongful death
Prenatal injury
Wrongful death
Prenatal injury
Wrongful death
Prenatal injury
Wrongful death
Wrongful death
Wrongful death
Prenatal injury
4119 Conn. Supp. 242, 111 A.2d 14 (1955).
42 19 Conn. Supp. 487, 118 A.2d 633 (1955).
43 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557 (1956).
4208 Ga. 201, 65 S.E.2d 909 (1951).
45 91 Ga. App. 712, 87 S.E.2d 100 (1955). The infant was stillborn.
48 212 Ga. 504, 93 S.E.2d 727 (1956).
47 415 Ill. 422, 114 N.E2d 412 (1953).48 415 Ill. 496, 114 N.E2d 721 (1953).
40 The Iowa state courts have not rendered a decision in this area. However, a
federal district court sitting in that state has allowed recovery. The case is cited
at note 34 supra.80368 P.2d 1 (Kan Sup. Ct. 1962).
51285 S.W.2d 901 (Ky. Ct. App. 1955). The infant wag stillborn.
52 39 So. 2d 352 (La. Ct. App. 1923). This was reaffirmed in Valence v. Louisiana
Power & Light Co., 50 So.2d 847 (La. Ct. App. 1951) involving a stillborn infant.
However, the evidence was held not sufficient to attribute the stillbirth to the accident.
3 197 Md. 417, 79 A2d 550 (1951).
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Massachusetts
Keyes v. Constr. Serv. Inc.54
Michigan
Newman v. City of Detroit5
Minnesota
Verkennes v. Corniea"
Mississippi
Rainey v. Horn57
Missouri
Steggall v. Morris5"
Nebraska
Drabbels v. Skelly Oil Co."
New Hampshire
Poliquin v. MacDonald"°
Bennett v. Hymers6 '
New Jersey
Smith v. Brennan6 2
New York
Woods v. Lancet"5
In re Logan's Estate"
Kelly v. Gregory 5
Ohio
Viable
Viable
Viable
Viable
Viable
Viable
Wrongful death
Wrongful death
Wrongful death
Wrongful death
Wrongful death
Wrongful death
Viable Wrongful death
Nonviable Prenatal injury
Nonviable Prenatal injury
Viable
Nonviable
Nonviable
Williams v. Marion Rapid Transit, Inc."6
Viable
Prenatal injury
Wrongful death
Prenatal injury
Prenatal injury
54 340 Mass. 633, 165 N.E2d 912 (1960). The court indicated that if the child had
been stillborn, no right of action would have been recognized. The parent case in the
common law jurisdiction, Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northampton, supra note 8, is
sharply limited and distinguished.
55 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W. 710 (1937). But note La Blue v. Specker, 358 Mich.
558, 100 N.W.2d 445 (1960). There an infant sued to recover damages under the
Liquor Control Act for the death of his alleged father. The suit was allowed, although
at the time of death of the alleged parent, the infant was a nonviable fetus. The
precise issue of prenatal injuries was not in the suit, but the court indicated that it
was favorable toward the modem trend recognizing a right of action to exist for
prenatal injury.
56 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
57 221 Miss. 269, 72 So.2d 434 (1954). The infant was stillborn.
58 363 Mo. 1224, 258 S.W.2d 577 (1953).
59 155 Neb. 17, 50 N.W.2d 229 (1951). The infant was stillborn. The court re-
served the question of whether a child born alive could maintain an action for prenatal
injuries.
60 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957). The infant was stillborn.
61101 N.H. 483, 147 A2d 108 (1958).
62 31 N.J. 353, 157 A.2d 497 (1960).
63 303 N.Y. 349, 102 N.E.2d 691 (1951).
04 3 N.Y.2d 800, 156 N.Y.S.2d 49, affirmed 156 N.Y.S.2d 152, 144 N.E.2d 644 (1957).
The infant was born dead.
65 125 N.Y.S.2d 696 (App. Div. 1953).
66 152 Ohio St. 114, 87 N.E.2d 334 (1949).
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Jasinsky v. Potts 7
Stidmane v. Ashmore"
Oklahoma
Howell v. Rushing 9
Oregon
Mallison v. Pomeroy"
Pennsylvania
Sinkler v. Kneale7 1
Rhode Island
Gorman v. Budlong7 2
South Carolina
Hall v. Murphy7 3
West v. McCoy74
Tennessee
Hogan v. McDaniel 5
Texas
Viable
Viable
Viable
Wrongful death t
Wrongful death t
Wrongful death *
Prenatal injury t
Nonviable Prenatal injury
Viable
Viable
"Quick"
Viable
Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan78
Washington
Seattle-First Nat'l Bank v. Rankin"7
Viable
Wisconsin
Lipps v. Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co."8
Nonviable
Wrongful death
Wrongful death
Wrongful death
Wrongful death
Wrongful death
Prenatal injury
Prenatal injury
67 153 Ohio St. 529, 92 N.E.2d 809 (1950). The infant was born alive but later
died as result of prenatal injuries.68 109 Ohio App. 431, 167 N.E2d 106 (1959). The infant was stillborn.
60 261 P.2d 217 (Okla. Sup. Ct. 1953). The infant was born dead.
70 205 Ore. 690, 291 P2d 225 (1955).
71401 Pa. 267, 164 A2d 93 (1960).
7223 RI. 169, 49 Atl. 704 (1901).
73 236 S.C. 257, 113 S.E2d 790 (1960). The infant lived four hours after birth.
74233 S.C. 369, 105 S.E2d 88 (1958). The infant was born dead. For a decision of
the federal district court sitting in South Carolina see note 35 supra.
75 204 Tenn. 235, 319 S.W.2d 221 (1958). The infant was stillborn.
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